PDF herunterladen
Nervenheilkunde 2012; 31(04): 226-230
DOI: 10.1055/s-0038-1628149
Neurophilosophie und Neuroethik
Schattauer GmbH

Philosophische Kriterien personaler Identität und neurowissenschaftliche Perspektive

Philosophical criteria for personal identity and neuroscience
S. M. Fischer
1   Institut für Philosophie, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte, TU Berlin
› Institutsangaben
Weitere Informationen

Publikationsverlauf

Eingegangen am: 13. Oktober 2011

angenommen am: 10. November 2011

Publikationsdatum:
23. Januar 2018 (online)

    Lizenzen und Reprints

Zusammenfassung

Der vorgelegte Aufsatz befragt verschiedene philosophische Kriterien personaler Identität nach ihrer Relevanz aus Sicht der Neurowissenschaften. Sowohl das psychologische als das somatische Kriterium wird zurückgewiesen. Demgegenüber verspricht das narrative Kriterium eine hohe Kongruenz zu neurowissenschaftlichen Konzepten und Fragestellungen. Zugleich impliziert es ein immanent ethisches Moment jenseits geistig-immaterieller oder genetisch-manifester Grundlagen und provoziert eine ganz eigene – für die Neurowissenschaft durchaus herausfordernde – ethische Perspektive.

Summary

Contemporary philosophy provides us with mainly three answers concerning the question of personal identity or identity over time: either a psychological or a somatic or a narrative approach. In this paper I claim that neither the somatic nor the psychological approach is compatible with basic conceptions in neuroscience, while the narrative criterion of personal identity on the other hand indeed seems to be. Additionally, the narrative criterion implicitly bears an ethical dimension and thus may become a relevant conception from a neuro-ethical point of view.

Schlüsselwörter

Personale Identität - neuronale Zustände - Narration - neurowissenschaftliche Relevanz

Keywords

Personal identity - neuronal states - narration - scientific relevance
 

  • Literatur

  • 1 Ayers M. Locke. London: Routledge; 1990
    Google Scholar
  • 2 Carpenter M. et al. Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 month of age. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. 199; 63.
    Google Scholar
  • 3 DeGrazia D. Persons, organisms, and the definition of death: a philosophical critique of the higher-brain-approach. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1999; 37: 419-40.
    CrossrefPubMedGoogle Scholar
  • 4 DeGrazia D. Human idientity and bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2005
    Google Scholar
  • 5 Dunn J. The beginning of social understanding. Oxford: Blackwell; 1988
    Google Scholar
  • 6 Garret B. Personal identity and self-consciousness. London: Routledge; 1998
    Google Scholar
  • 7 Gibson J. Wahrnehmung und Umwelt. Der ökologische Ansatz in der visuellen Wahrnehmung. München: Urban und Schwarzenberg; 1982
    Google Scholar
  • 8 Gómez JC. et al. The comparative study of early communications and theory of mind. In: Baron-Cohen et al.(Hrsg.) Understanding other minds: Perspectivs from autism. New York: Oxford University Press; 1983
    Google Scholar
  • 9 Gopnik A. How we know our minds. The illusion from first person knowledge about intentionality. Behavioural and Brain Science 1993; 16: 1-14.
    Google Scholar
  • 10 Gopnik A, Meltzoff A. Words, thoughts and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1997
    Google Scholar
  • 11 Harris P. The work of the imagination. In: Whiten (Hrsg.). Natural theories of mind. Oxford: Blackwell; 1991
    Google Scholar
  • 12 Harris P. Desires, beliefs, and language. In: Carruthers, Smith (Hrsg.). Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1996
    Google Scholar
  • 13 Kruger C. The effect of peer and adult-child transactive discussions on moral reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 1992; 38: 191-211.
    Google Scholar
  • 14 Lewis D. Survival and identity. In: Rorty (Hrsg.): The identities of persons. Berkeley; California: 1976
    Google Scholar
  • 15 MacIntyre A. Der Verlust der Tugend. Frankfurt/ Main: Suhrkamp; 1984
    Google Scholar
  • 16 MacIntyre A. The virtues, the unity of a human life and the concept of a tradition. In: Hauerwas, Jones (Hrsg.): Why narrative?. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; 1989
    Google Scholar
  • 17 Mackie D. Personal identity and dead people. Philosophical Studies 1999; 95: 219-42.
    CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • 18 McDowell J. Reductionism and the first person. In: Dancy (Hrsg.): Reading Parfit. Oxford: Blackwell; 1979
    Google Scholar
  • 19 Moore C, Dunham P. Joint attention. Its origin and role in development. Hilsdale: Erlbaum; 1995
    Google Scholar
  • 20 Nagel T. The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1986
    Google Scholar
  • 21 Noonan H. Animalism versus Lockeanism: a current controversy. The Philosophical Quarterly 1998; 48: 302-18.
    CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • 22 Noonan H. Personal identity London: Routledge; 2003
  • 23 Nozick R. Philosophical explanations. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; 1981
    Google Scholar
  • 24 Olson ET. The human animal: personal identity without psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1997
    Google Scholar
  • 25 Olson ET. Was I ever a fetus?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1997; 58: 95-109.
    Google Scholar
  • 26 Olson ET. An argument for animalism. In: Martin, Barresi (Hrsg.). Personal identity. Oxford: Blackwell; 2003
    Google Scholar
  • 27 Parfit D. Personal identity. The Philosophical Review 1971; 80: 3-27.
    CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • 28 Parfit D. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1984
    Google Scholar
  • 29 Schechtman M. The Constitution of selfs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 1996
    Google Scholar
  • 30 Shoemaker S. Persons and their pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 1970; 7: 269-85.
    Google Scholar
  • 31 Shoemaker S. Personal identity. Oxford: Blackwell; 1984
    Google Scholar
  • 32 Shoemaker S. Self and substance. Philosophical Perspectives 1997; 11: 283-319.
    Google Scholar
  • 33 Shoemaker S. Self, body, and coincidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1999; 73 Suppl 287-306.
    CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • 34 Snowdon PF. Persons, animals, and ourselves. In: Gill (Hrsg.). The person and the human mind. Oxford: Clarendon; 1990
    Google Scholar
  • 35 Taylor C. Sources of the self: the making of modern identity. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; 1989
    Google Scholar
  • 36 Tomasello M. Joint attention as social cognition. In: Moore, Dunham (Hrsg.). Joint attention. Its origin and role in development. Hilsdale: Erlbaum; 1995
    Google Scholar
  • 37 Trabasso T, Stein N. Children’s knowledge of events: A causal analysis of story structure. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation 1981; 15: 237-82.
    Google Scholar
  • 38 Trevarthen C. Predispositions to cultural learning in young infants. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1993; 16: 534-5.
    Google Scholar
  • 39 Unger P. Identity, consciousness, and value. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1990
    Google Scholar
  • 40 Unger P. The survival of the sentient. Philosophical Perspectives 11. Malden: Blackwell; 2000
    Google Scholar
  • 41 Vygotskij L. Geschichte der höheren psychischen Funktionen. Münster: Lit; 1992
    Google Scholar
  • 42 Wiggins D. Sameness and substance. Oxford: Blackwell; 1980
    Google Scholar
  • 43 Williams B. The self and the future. Philosophical Review 1970; 59: 161-80.
    Google Scholar