Wettbewerb zwischen Generika und Originalherstellern in Österreich am Beispiel der ACE-Hemmer

Zusammenfassung

Einleitung: Österreichs Preise für Arzneimittel sind stark reguliert, was Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb zwischen Generika- und Originalherstellern hat.

Ziel: Wir möchten den Effekt der in Österreich praktizierten Preisregulierung bei Patentablauf auf ausgewählte Indikatoren der Wettbewerbsdynamik untersuchen.

Methodik: Anhand des Beispiels der ACE-Hemmer beschreiben wir für Österreich anhand 6 verschiedener Kennzahlen, wie der Wettbewerb zwischen Originalherstellern und Österreich verläuft und vergleichen unsere Ergebnisse mit amerikanischen Daten von Grabowski und Vernon.

Ergebnisse: Unser Vergleich zeigt, dass es in Österreich aufgrund der Regulierung einen geringeren Wettbewerb zwischen den Generikaherstellern gibt und daher der Marktanteil von Generikaherstellern geringer ist. Dieses Ergebnis stützt Erkenntnisse in der Literatur, die einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Regulierung und Generikamarktanteil ermitteln.

Fazit: Unsere Ergebnisse sind wichtig für die wirtschaftspolitische Diskussion im Gesundheitswesen, die nach Wegen sucht, Medikamentenkosten in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung unter Kontrolle zu halten.

Abstract

Background: The market for pharmaceuticals in Austria is highly regulated and manufacturers cannot set prices freely after patent expiration of the pioneer drug.

Objectives: We wanted to examine the effect of price regulation on price competition between branded and generic drugs in Austria.

Methods: We examined the Austrian market for ACE inhibitors and describe competitive dynamics by means of 6 indices. We compared our results with those of Grabowski and Vernon who studied the US market.

Results: According to our analysis the competition amongst the producers of generic drugs is not great and consequently, compared to the USA, over time the prices for generic products decrease less and their market share increases less. This is due to a market-oriented system in the USA which waives most regulatory provisions. Our conclusions are in line with the findings by Danzon und Chao (2000) who argue that in a price-regulated market competitive dynamics are less strongly developed.

Conclusions: From a politico-economic view, the necessity of price regulations in the pharmaceutical market seems questionable, as price regulations generally also cause other negative effects, such as distorted economic incentives for research and development investments.

Schlüsselwörter

Arzneimittelmarkt - Wettbewerb - Generika - Österreich

Key words

pharmaceuticals - generic - competition - Austria

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