Medicine and Aviation: A Review of the Comparison

Summary

Objective: This paper aims to understand the nature of medical error in highly technological environments and argues that a comparison with aviation can blur its real understanding.

Methods: This study is a comparative study between the notion of error in health care and aviation based on the author’s own ethnographic study in intensive care units and findings from the research literature on errors in aviation.

Results and Conclusions: Failures in the use of medical technology are common. In attempts to understand the area of medical error, much attention has focused on how we can learn from aviation. This paper argues that such a comparison is not always useful, on the basis that (i) the type of work and technology is very different in the two domains; (ii) different issues are involved in training and procurement; and (iii) attitudes to error vary between the domains. Therefore, it is necessary to look closely at the subject of medical error and resolve those questions left unanswered by the lessons of aviation.

Keywords

Medical error - safety-critical systems - medical technology - aviation - adverse incidents

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